


Nuestra Realidad es Otra

Changing realities in Lima's peripheral settlements: a case study from San Juan de Miraflores



Michaela Hordijk
University of Amsterdam
m.a.hordijk@uva.nl

What matters in housing are the relationships between people, activity and place
J.F.C. Turner¹

Abstract

Fifty years of habitat studies, analyses of social movements and urban collective action have produced a rich and varied knowledge on how the urban poor struggle for access to land and urban services. This paper however argues that this accumulated knowledge is inadequate to capture the current reality of the second and third generation of Lima's urban poor. Their upbringing, their socialization process and their current living circumstances (both in material and immaterial terms) are so different from what their grand-parents and parents experienced, that we will have to renew our knowledge base on urban poverty and urban collective action. The paper is based on a longitudinal study which compares the situation of the poor in a peripheral district in 1997 with the situation of the same families and their children in 2010. It builds on both a quantitative analyses of household survey data, as well as qualitative material gathered in open interviews and focus groups with both first, second and third generation representatives.

Key words: urban poor, collective action, self-help housing, Lima

Introduction:

Limenean *barriada* formation has left remarkable traces in Southern oriented urban development studies for a number of reasons. First of all because two highly influential scholars based their theories and policy proposals on how they interpreted Lima's *barriada* formation. In the early 1960s the British architect John F.C. Turner popularized the notion of "self-help housing"² based on Lima's *barriada* formation. It became the source of inspiration for the 'sites and services projects' in many Southern cities. Thanks to Turners theories Lima even deserved a section in Peter Hall's "Cities of Tomorrow: an intellectual history of urban planning and design the twentieth century" (Hall, 1988). Three decades later the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto acquired world-fame with his theories on the role property rights could play in poverty reduction strategies. His work was embraced by inter alia the World Bank,

1 <http://www.urban-studies.de/turner.htm> accessed 2-10-2010

2 The term "aided self help housing" was in 1945 coined by J.L Crane, head of the International Office of the US National Housing Department, based on projects in Puerto Rico. Crane promoted the notion in his agency. See for a detailed description of the interplay between American and Peruvian influences in Peru's housing policy Bromley 2003.

and inspired numerous land-registration projects. It is not the aim of this study to analyse how accurately their models and theories reflected Lima's reality. That has recently been done elsewhere (Chambers 2005; Corzo, Riofrío et al. 2006; Fernandez Maldonado 2007). From these publications we can draw that in general terms John Turners thoughts are proven right. De Soto's theories regarding the expected the effects of granting property rights have proven mistaken³. It is the aim of this paper to contrast the empirical reality of Lima in Turners era, with the empirical reality of today's *barriadas*, to see to what extent his influential theories still fit. It does so by comparing the conditions of the households in one of the *barriadas* in the Southern Cone studied in 1996-2000 with the conditions of many of the same households in 2010. In 1997 a survey was held among 496 households. These surveys were complemented with numerous interviews and a series participatory workshops on neighbourhood improvement (Hordijk 1999; Hordijk 2000). In 2010 250 of these households were willing to participate in a retake of the original survey. The survey was complemented with a series of interviews with residents (both founding members and their grown up children) and neighbourhood leaders, two workshops with founding members of the settlements, and two workshops with the second generation *pobladores*. This paper furthermore draws on the work of Plyushteva (2009), who interviewed 46 young adults from the second generation in Pampas, explicitly contrasting their situation with the situation of their parents⁴.

The empirical origin of the “Turnerian approach”

In contrast to many other cities around the world, land availability was until recently not a real issue in Lima or other Peruvian coastal cities. Lima is situated at the foothill of the Andean mountains in one of the driest deserts in the world. Except for the small strips of fertile land that bordered the three rivers that provided Lima's drinking water, Lima's peripheral land had no productive or commercial value when the city's growth accelerated in the 1950s. Consequently squatter invasions in these peripheral vacant lands encountered relatively little resistance, and organized invasions became an informally accepted housing strategy for the Limenean poor. A second interesting feature of Lima's *barriada* formation was that Peruvian housing policies were relatively progressive. Already in the 1940s the military government of General Odría (1948-1956) used the promotion of squatter settlements as the main instrument in his populist policies. In 1949 two important laws were passed. The first one gave the government the right to subdivide and sell land for urbanisation; the second one turned all land without an undisputed owner into public property, thus providing the state with a vast amount of vacant desert land available for settlement. Issues of land-property were only negotiated with recognised (i.e. registered) neighbourhood organisations, not with individuals, which tremendously enhanced the formation of these organisations (Kross 1992:279; Hordijk 2000:75). The politically induced institutionalization of the phenomenon “neighbourhood organization” blended with the indigenous culture of cooperation of the Andean migrants. In the Andean rural communities land was communally held and cultivated, communal labour for public works was common (the so called *faenas*). Peruvians are considered to have a propensity to work together, organize and volunteer (Bromley 2003:281), and *faenas* also became part of community life in the invasion areas.

3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss de Soto's thoughts in detail. In essence he predicted that if the poor would get the property titles of the land they inhabited, their plots could serve as collateral for loans in the formal financial sector. This would unleash great potential, both for home improvement as well for informal entrepreneurs who had otherwise no access to formal financial markets.

4 I herewith would like to thank Anna Plyushteva for handing on all her research materials to me. The thoughts expressed in this paper would not have been developed without her input. Whenever I use her materials (dated 2009) I refer to this with her initials AP.

Textbox 1: “The cheap house that growth”

On December 24 1954 the first massive land invasion took place in Lima. Over 5000 settlers invaded land South of Lima. And although difficult to prove, many believe that the colourful opposition leader and owner of the right wing conservative newspapers *La Prensa* and *la Ultima Hora* – Pedro Beltran (1897-1979) – supported the invasion. Beltran was one of the countries leading oligarchs. He had studied at the London School of Economics during the World War I, and served as Peru’s ambassador to the USA during World War II. He was also involved in the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the foundation of the UN. Back home he introduced the American concept of “Savings and Loan Associations”, inter alia through his newspaper editorials. The invasion in what became known as “Ciudad de Dios” was also used to illustrate his policy “La Casa Barrata que crece”, or “the cheap house that growth”. Beltran’s idea was to start with an affordable basic unit that could be extended over the years.

The invasion was in part used as a means to get residents out of certain inner slum areas, areas owned by the Prado family. Prado was elected president two years after the invasion of Ciudad de Dios took place. The invasion of Ciudad de Dios was legalized by the Prado government in 1958. Its development as “sites and services project *avant la lettre*” figures prominently in the seminal book “Las Barriadas de Lima” by the Peruvian anthropologist José Matos Mar (1977). Ciudad de Dios was the first seedling of what later became Lima’s Cono Sur, and the first settlement of one of its constituent districts: San Juan de Miraflores.

Textbox1: “The Cheap house that growth”

Source: Hordijk 2000

John Turner arrived in Lima in 1957, shortly after Manuel Prado was elected president (1956-1962). Prado’s government was one of the first to receive USA grants to support the “savings and loans associations” for housing finance (Bromley 2003:278). In the first month of his presidency Prado nominated the Commission for Agricultural Reform and Housing (CRAV), headed by Pedro Beltran (see textbox 1). The commission saw as its major task to structure and legalize the occupation of low value land without affecting the conventional land market of the more affluent parts of Lima. Therewith the strategy of the satellite cities, in which new self-sustaining growth poles were supposed to develop themselves in Lima’s outskirts, was born. When Beltran became prime minister (1958) he established the Institute of Housing, in which John Turner served for a while. In 1961 the Prado government passed the famous “Law of the *barriadas*”. Through this law all existing *barriadas* were legalized to ensure security of tenure, and state support for the installation of services was promised. Implicitly this policy signalled the message that housing provision for the poor was not a state responsibility. The state limited itself to provide the land, and support the installation of basic services. Turner witnessed all these developments, and supported a number of “aided self-help projects” during his various stays in Lima.

Based on his experience in Lima Turner argued that people could save up to 50% of their housing costs if the state would support *barriada* formation through the provision of land, technical assistance and credits for building materials (Fernandez 2007). Turner identified three stages in this *barriada*-development: incipient, developing and complete (see table 1).

Table 1: Squatter Settlement: Progressive Development
 Source: Turner 1967, cited in Chambers 2005:211

Table 1: Squatter Settlement: Progressive Development			
	Incipient (1-2 years)	Developing (4-5 years)	Complete (10-12 years)
Lay-out	60m ² -400m ² plots per family. Land reserved for community facilities		Subdivision of plots, increased densities. Development of fringes of settlements on less suitable sites
Houses	Straw huts, some permanent structures	Ground floor shell of permanent material, temporary roof	Ground floor complete with permanent roof, second floor started, subdivision or subletting
Public utilities	Water drums, kerosene candles	Stand pipes, local electricity generators	Mains water, mains electricity, sewers
Community facilities	Market, stalls, bars, primary schools, chapels	Artisan workshops, TV-cinemas, parish centres, medical facilities for visiting doctors and dentists	Banks, cinema's, restaurants, special stores, small industries: furniture, shoes, tricycles, iron work, clinics
Communications	Public buses, communal taxis, dust roads	Consolidated roads, thus better bus services	Better buses, public telephones, post office, surfaced roads

Aided self help would, according to Turner, not only lead to physical improvement, but would also foster a sense of community and social well-being. For this to happen it was important that people would have the autonomy to design their own houses. Turner had presented his thoughts to the World Bank. Soon thereafter the Bank changed its housing policies from central state delivery to enablement (Harris 2003; Fernandez Maldonado 2007) After the Habitat conference in 1976 in Vancouver enablement and "aided self help" became the norm for most international institutions (Fernandez 2007:4). As in the Peruvian case the turn to "enablement" most often implied an elegant way of "letting the poor take care of themselves".

After Turner left Peru three other major government interventions left their marks in Lima's *barriada* formation. The left wing military government of Velasco (1968-1975) is credited for having developed "pro-settler" legislation that laid out the rules of the game for land-invasions. With their tradition of self-help and community organization the invasion settlements were seen as the germ of the "self-management model" the military intended to develop throughout the country. The government thus created the National System for the support of Social Mobilisation (SINAMOS). Most importantly: settlers on public land who were not forcefully evicted within 24 hours no longer had to fear violent evictions. Velasco thus not only made support to self-build and self-managed communities a spearhead of his housing policies, he also gave invaders a strong sense of de facto security of tenure. In Villa El Salvador, a new district founded in the Velasco area, SINAMOS experimented with state support for self-managed communities. Until today Villa El Salvador is one a district in which "popular participation" is part of the local identity, and community organization is strongest. A second important programme has been the programme of Lima's first socialist mayor Alfonso Barrantes (1983-1986). Although Barrantes will be most remembered for founding the programme "Vaso de Leche"⁵, he also launched four special programmes for legalisation and development of the *barriadas*. Through this programmes he tried to address rapidly increasing land-speculations and fraudulent

5 This "Glass of Milk" programme provides all children under 6 and lactating mothers with a glass of milk a day. The "comités vaso de leche" that were set up for the distribution of this milk are still functioning in many neighbourhoods, and still distribute milk on a daily basis.

practices. The programme handed out 134.000 land-titles in three years, In general municipal investments per capita doubled under Barrantes, but in the *barriadas* it increased to 11 times the level of the previous government.

A last important programme that has run in Lima's *barriadas* was set up following de Soto's suggestions of legalizing land property. The Fujimori government launched the Commission for the Formalization of Land Property (COFOPRI). COFOPRI legalized almost half a million titles in Lima between 1996 and 2007.

In summary: Turners prospects for self-help housing and the progressive social and physical development of the *barriadas* were formed under exceptional fortunate circumstances: easy accessible low value land, and a Peruvian state that could practice "laissez faire" at low costs. Already in 1978 the Peruvian researcher Riofrío started to warn that the model would soon reach its limits because suitable land would become scarce (Riofrío 1978). From the mid 1980s onwards the characteristics of invasions changed: the settlements became smaller and more and more took place on the risky slopes, unsuitable for urbanization. Analyzing the dynamics of *barriada* formation Barreda and Ramirez (2004) distinguish three generations. The first one generation were the *barriadas* formed on the sides of the river Rimac and a number of other almost inhabitable sites within the city (1940-1954). These *barriadas* were relatively small and weak in organizational terms. Since physical conditions were difficult, there level of consolidation falls behind the level reached in the "second generation" *barriadas*. The invasion Ciudad de Dios (see textbox 1) is the first representative of the second generation. This is the generation that inspired Turners thoughts: the larger invasions on the peripheral low value desert land, which was later connected to the city. Most of these lands were far more suitable for construction and less dangerous. It formed the nucleos of what later became Lima's North, South and East Cone. These "Cones" nowadays house over 60% of Lima's population. The third generation *barriadas*, formed from the end of the eighties onwards, are dubbed 'marginal' *barriadas*. They are again smaller in size, and take place on the inhabitable slopes surrounding the newly formed "Cones", or surrounding Lima's beach resorts along the Southern axes. Either because of the distance, or because of the inhospitable sites consolidation of these settlements is more costly and difficult (Barreda and Ramirez 2004).

Pampas de San Juan: a tale of progressive development

The consolidation process in the neighbourhoods of Pampas de San Juan exemplifies Beltran's "cheap house that grows" (see textbox one), Turner's "aided self help" and "progressive development" through community action. They also illustrate the changing tides between the neighbourhood organizations and the Peruvian state.

Whereas most of the land around Ciudad de Dios, the centre of the newly recognized district San Juan de Miraflores, rapidly filled up, the flat areas around the water treatment ponds remained untouched by invaders. The land was known to be private property, and thus unsuitable for invasion. Yet since its owner did not give use to the lands, rumours were spread that the land would revert back to the state. Lands speculators aware of this started to sell large plots (up to 400 m²) to "*cooperativas*" and "*asociaciones de vivienda*"; housing associations modelled after loans and savings associations introduced by Beltran. The first democratically elected Mayor of San Juan de Miraflores also engaged in selling land-titles, although he had no authority over the land at all. When the settlers that bought the land became aware that they were cheated, they rapidly established themselves on their plots to claim their rights. Yet until today most of them wish to be recognized as a "*cooperativa*", where people paid for their land instead of claiming it through invasions. As soon as became clear that the newcomers would not be evicted, the remaining land rapidly filled up with invasions. Between 1975 and 1985 29 settlements were established, with a total of almost 10.000 families.

With its fraudulent origin and mounting disputes over land property, Pampas de San Juan was one of the ideal candidates for Barrantes legalization and development programme. Twenty out of the twenty-nine settlements participated in Barrantes programme and earned an individual land title. The other nine decided to maintain their status as cooperative, and earned a “de facto” security of tenure since their urban development plans were recognized by the municipal authorities.

Although the area of Pampas de San Juan therewith seemed urbanized, between 1985 and 1996 another 15 invasions occurred. These invasions took place on the steep slopes, seemingly uninhabitable, or on land that in existing settlements was reserved for public functions such as parks. They were far smaller in size (an average 65 households, the smallest consisting of 20 households) and clearly belong to what Barreda and Ramirez (2004) called third generation or ‘marginal invasions’. In 1998-2000 all settlements in Pampas were visited by Fujimori’s land-titling COFOPRI. For most households it meant an unexpected legal hurdle, since they already had their deeds registered through the programme of Barrantes. For the third generation invasions it meant that their plots were legalized, and that they could start the construction of their houses in durable materials.

In 1996 most of the “second generation *barriadas*” in Pampas already had reached Turner’s phase of “complete” *barriada*. More than 40% of the households had built their first floor from durable materials, although still with a contemporary roof. Another third already realized their concrete roof, and 10% even had a second floor of durable materials. Over 80% had a domestic drinking water connection, and over 70% private toilet. The lack and the quality of the drinking water were nevertheless considered the most pressing problem in the sector. Water run only twice a week for ca. 6 hours from the tap, and had to be stored in watertanks where the quality rapidly deteriorated. The major roads were paved, and the area counted with innumerable small shops (many with public phones), services and restaurants. There also were a number of informal markets, some also offering clothing and household utensils. Along the major road many small workshops were established. One of the distinguishing functions in Turners classification that was saliently missing, were the banks. In those days banks required an initial deposit of US\$ 500 to open a bank account, a sum out of reach of most inhabitants. For cinemas the *pobladores* had to go to Ciudad de Dios, a few bus stops down the main road. The situation in the “third generation *barriadas*” on the slopes was very different. They were still in the incipient phase. Most of the houses were built from wood or even straw mats, and lacked water and sanitation.

An important detail for the subject of this study: 80% of the families were nuclear families, the majority with most of their children under 16. Around two of the male breadwinners worked in the informal sector, over 60% of their spouses stayed at home.

People remembered the arduous struggle:

There was nothing when we came here, no roads, no transport, no water, nothing. It was just desert. We had to struggle for everything. In the first years we had to go to Ciudad de Dios to get our water, all the way to the Avenida de los Heroes. There just was a trail in the loose sand, that was all. I constructed a barrow with wooden wheels, you could always hear me coming with the buckets of water, bumping over the stony road, four-five kilometres up and down. We have achieved everything through our joined efforts. (Alfredo, in an interview in 1996).



Fig 1: A typical street in Pampas 1996 – first floor in durable construction, but still with a water tank in front.

Although collective action and neighbourhood organizations played a very important role in the consolidation process of the settlements, more than half of them laid dormant in the mid 1990s. Most people indicated that since many basic needs were met, people started to focus more on progress of their household. Many organizations however were still in existence, and could be mobilized at any time. People remembered with nostalgia the days they were still united:

“In the past we were much more together, you know. We had to do everything together. We had general assemblies every other week. We had our faenas, we opened up the roads together, and we had clean up campaigns to clean the neighbourhood. We were much more united. Now everyone is busy with his own affairs. We never have assemblies anymore, and if we have, nobody goes (Delia, 42, interview in 1996).

Only in the newest invasion sites on the slopes, where all services still had to be realized, there was very active participation. During *faenas* people helped to level the roads to the top of the hill. Neighbourhood leaders had managed to get public tap points installed for the drinking water provision. During fortnightly assemblies possibilities and prices of domestic connections were heavily debated.

Pampas de San Juan in 2010

Physical and economic improvement but social deterioration

At first sight there are four major changes in Pampas in 2010: almost all roads are paved; many houses have now two or more floors build from durable materials; the small moto-tricycles can drive you anywhere you want to go, and Peru's most conservative bank offers its services everywhere in the district. Pampas de San Juan seems to have developed beyond Turners expectations. Several markets that were informal in the mid 1990s are now formalized and offer a wider range of products. You can almost reach the highest hills by car. Where road construction is really impossible, staircases are constructed. In the incipient invasions that got their land titles in 2000 most of the houses are now constructed in durable materials, some even already with a second floor. Since 2008 they even have the domestic drinking water and sewerage connection.

The local economy has diversified and grown. Whereas in 1996s one only could make copies at the main road, small shops now offer this facilities everywhere. There are

also many internet cabins, both legal and hidden. In one of the oldest neighbourhoods, the “*hostals*” have proliferated. Here you can hire a room per hour, they advertise with Jacuzzis and gyms. In almost a quarter of the houses of the original sample we observed a kind of economic activity, from renting rooms to all different kind of shops, internet cabins or private primary schools.

Peru has gone through a period of steady economic growth since the mid 1990s, with an average growth rate of 7% since 2003. With 9.8% economic growth in 2009 it even became the fastest growing economy in the region. This has had its effects in settlements in Pampas. Perfectly in line with Beltran’s “cheap house that grows” over two thirds of the households have managed to construct new parts of the house in the last 10 years, in more than half of the cases this was done to be able to lodge the children. Also the possession of consumables increased considerably: Whereas almost half of the households had a fridge in 1996, this has risen to 79% nowadays. In 1996 6% possessed a car; by 2010 this has risen to 20%. We included new durable consumables in the 2010 survey, which showed that 37% has a washing machine, 30% owns a computer, and 20% even has internet access in their homes⁶ in 2010. Only one third of the families that participated in the communal kitchens in the past continue to do so, this is 17% of all households in the sample.

An important change occurred within the households:

“The situation has changed a lot in Pampas. We are in very different conditions nowadays. The children now help to cover the costs, that makes live much easier. In many households the situation is much better now than in the past” (Interview with Nora, (55) in 2010).

Indeed do two thirds of the respondents in the 2010 survey confirm that their children contribute to the household income. We can thus conclude that both the economic situation of the households and the physical situation of the neighbourhoods have improved considerably.

This is not to say that people experience no problems anymore. Violence from youth gangs and robberies increased significantly. Over 90% of the respondents in 2010 cited violence and youth gangs as the most important problem in their neighbourhood, and the most significant negative change over the last decade. It was already a problem in the 1990s, but it has increased both in intensity as in the kind of violence experienced. Many housing blocks have organized to install some kind of security measure⁷, to reduce the risk “*that they come*

Fig. 2 A typical street in Pampas de San Juan 2010, paved streets and sidewalks, improved houses, cars in front, and bars to protect the new wealth.



6 Responses to the questions about income seemed so notoriously inadequate that they have been discarded.

7 How the security situation has formed a new reason to organize in Lima’s *barriadas* has been documented by Ploger 2006. In the case of Pampas de San Juan an important difference is that for security measures households organize at the level of the housing block (*manzana*) or street, not at the level of the neighbourhood.

all armed with big cars, and empty the house, as happened three times in my street” (Cecilia, 2010 workshop⁸)

Despite the clear improvements that everybody recognized, most respondents were negative about the situation in Pampas. The limitations as a consequence of the increased violence were felt in daily life. People are afraid, don't dare to go out after dark, feel forgotten by the authorities, and powerless. *“If you defend yourself, they come after your children, they know you, you know* (Cecilia, 46, workshop participant 2010).

The “new” generation: Our reality is different

The 496 households visited in 1997 reported 1377 children living in their households. Two thirds of them were under 16, a quarter of them was between 16 and 25 years of age, and only 10 percent was older than 25 in that era. Of this cohort we could trace the current situation of 624 children. The respondents in 2010 furthermore reported 130 children born between 1997 and 2010 (not counting the grandchildren that had been born and were living with them).

The respondent’s substantial investments in the education of their children clearly paid off. Seventy percent of the children from the 1996 sample completed secondary school, 20% had followed vocational training, and 10% even attended university. Therewith they realize the dream ‘that my child becomes a professional’, a quote very often heard from both children and their parents in my 1996-2000 fieldwork periods. Over 50% of the youngsters between 16-25 years old is still studying, and even 15% of the 26-35 year old is still enrolled. Of those still studying most do this in a kind of vocational training, but 20% is enrolled at university level.

An average 70% of the second generation is currently working (see table 2)

	61,7%	38,3%	100,0%	22,2%	71,7%	6,1%	100,0%
26-35 years	153	29	182	49	109	11	169
	84,1%	15,9%	100,0%	29,0%	64,5%	6,5%	100,0%
36-45 years	56	16	72	25	38	3	66
	77,8%	22,2%	100,0%	37,9%	57,6%	4,5%	100,0%
46-55 years	10	2	12	1	8	0	9
	83,3%	16,7%	100,0%	11,1%	88,9%	,0%	100,0%
55 years or older	2	0	2	0	1	1	1
	100,0%	,0%	100%	,0%	50%	50%	100,0%
Total	377	144	521	115	285	25	425
	72,4%	27,6%	100,0%	27,1%	67,1%	5,9%	100,0%

Table2: Employment situation second generation
Source: Authors survey 2010

Almost a third of them has a job that offers some kind of social security, such as a health insurance. There is a weak but significant correlation between age and having a job with social security benefits. Whereas only 22% of the 16-25 years who are working have such benefits, almost 40% of the 36-45 years old do. Over the years this second generation seems to improve their employment situation. As promising is that especially in the 26-45 years of age group more than half of this second generation has a job that corresponds their level of education (according to the responding parent).

⁸ It is interesting to note that Western scholars visiting the *barriadas* judge the changes in positive terms (see Chambers 2005; SIGUS 2005) whereas Peruvian scholars point to the low quality of most of the housing (not build adequately. The structures are certainly not adequate for the two or three floors build in an earth quake prone area), low quality services and continuing exclusion (Corzo and Riofrio 2006).

Table 3: Correspondence between level of the job and level of education (according to the responding parent)
Source: authors survey 2010

Age in classes	Does his/her work corresponds the level of education?				Total
	Works below level	Works conform level	Works above level	Does not know	
	16-25 years	52 54,2%	37 38,5%	1 1,0%	
26-35 years	35 36,5%	47 49,0%	2 2,1%	12 12,5%	96 100,0%
36-45 years	5 14,3%	23 65,7%	0 ,0%	7 20,0%	35 100,0%
46-55 years	1 33,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 66,7%	3 100,0%
55 years or older	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%	1 100,0%
Total	93 40,3%	107 46,3%	3 1,3%	28 12,1%	231 100,0%

Eighty percent of these children still live in the house of their parents, even though 60% of the children above 16 already have their own family. Also of those having a family of their own, more than half (56%) still live with their parents. Another 30% lives with other family members, most often their in laws. However: a surprising 26% has been able to buy a house, in contrast only 7% invaded.

Table 4: Housing situation of grown up children not living with their parents
Source: Authors survey 2010

Table Housing situation of grown up children not living with their parents.	
Invasion – no title	3%
Invasion – legalized	4%
Bought	26%
Rented	33%
Living with family members	30%
Other	4%
Total	100%
	N= 135

In the interviews it was confirmed that this new generation prefers buying and renting above invading. Plyushteva (2009) documented how the young adults in Pampas still cherish the heroic invasion history of their parents and the era of collective action. But most have no intention to repeat their parent's story.

“ Invasion, oh no! Way too risky. You have to work for your house, you know. You have to safe money. If you put all your efforts in, you can you know” (Jorge, 22 in an interview in 2010)

Well, I don't know, these days, invasions are very far away. In the desert – sand, sand everywhere... Heat. There's no water, there's no electricity. Nothing. Why would I go there, when I have such ease here [living in his parents' house]. No, actually, I think it wouldn't be good for me. If I go there, I would have to start from zero. (Juan, 20, in an interview in with AP in 2009)

“No, I will not invade. I am putting money aside. I want to buy a house here, in Pinos, near my family. I almost have the initial quote of US\$ 5000 completed. I hope to buy early next year (Judith, 28, in an interview in 2010).

Judith exemplifies the situation of many young adults in Pampas. She lives with her husband and 1,5 year old son in a little room on the second floor of her parents in law. Her husband works as skilled construction worker. Judith has managed to finish a university degree in accountancy, and works now with

a private company, with all benefits attached to this. She will most probably be able to pay the initial sum.

This is not to say that invasions do not occur anymore. People, including members of the second and third generation, are still trying to settle on the steepest slopes (see textbox 2). These youngest invasions are even more marginal and smaller in size than Barreda's and Ramirez' third generation *barriadas*. They repeat the entire repertoire of strategies inherent to *barriada* formation, and are prone to the same corruption and fraudulent practices.

Textbox 2 “L’histoire se repete”: the youngest invasion in Pampas de San Juan

Three years ago over 100 people invaded one of the last steep slopes between the neighbourhoods Pinos and Las dos Cruces in Pampas. The invasion resembled the heroic stories of the past. Family members knocked on doors of relatives to spread the news of the attempt, and many dashed with some sticks and plastics to try their luck. They were so many, that most of them could only uncomfortably sit on their plastics to wait and see. Within a week most had withdrawn, but still too many remained seen the very limited size of the site. A strict rule was enacted that only those that permanently lived on their plot could claim the land. Each night it was checked whether someone slept in the shack. Only in cases of serious illness or birth one could get a leave of absence without losing the informal right to the plot. By June 2010 24 families were still there and had put together a shack. Only six of them had members that had grown up in Pinos, all others came from other settlements. A neighbourhood leader was chosen to negotiate with the municipality. He collected 200 soles per household for regularization. Although a municipal engineer came to check the site, nothing happened and the money vanished. Whether it is with the engineer or the neighbourhood leader, nobody knows. It was one of the sources of an internal division among the invaders. The majority remains loyal to the originally elected neighbourhood leader, and try to negotiate with municipal officers. They however try to bypass the neighbourhood council of the neighbourhood Pinos, to which the land officially belongs. In the perimetric plan of Pinos the site is indicated as a park. The neighbourhood leaders of Pinos would have to solicit a change of land-use of this piece of land, so that it can become habitable. Some say the leader from Pinos has sold some plots, others swear these allegations are untrue and unfair.

In at least one respect the life of these new invaders is easier than during the invasions of their parents: with hoses they bring water uphill from their parents home, and it also at their parents home that they bath and go to the toilet.

Everybody except the invaders themselves are convinced that the plots will never be legalized. The site has been visited by engineers from Civil Defence and is judged to be too unsafe. Whether the Peruvian officials will give in in the long run, as they did so often in the past, or keep to the strict rules of today remains to be seen.

Textbox 2: “L’histoire se repete”; the youngest invasion in Pampas de San Juan

Source: various interviews and a workshop, 2010

The second and third generation in Pampas is also less inclined to participate in existing forms of collective action, such as the neighbourhood organizations or the *comedores*. A very clear reason for this is that there is little left to struggle for in these old forms of organizing. Services as piped water and paved roads can only be achieved through collective action. Already in the 1990s Riofrío noted that the collective phase is a phase *prior* to and *necessary* for an individual phase (Riofrío 1991). In the mid 1990s interest in the organizations had waned among the original settlers. With almost all roads paved, many parks constructed and only a few sidewalks still missing, the neighbourhood environment offers little to spark enthusiasm for collective action. But this is not the only reason. The second generation also has seen to many struggles and corrupt practices.

This organizing is of no use. It takes too much time, too much talking and no action. And in the end they take your money, not thanks! (Jorge, 20, interview 2010)

Of course, there are advantages in having a neighbourhood council, especially for the people who need help. But there are also "cons". The main one is that there is always at least one person who tries to benefit from it. Because they are always collecting money for some initiative or project, and they always take something for themselves.

(Debora, 22, in an interview with AP in 2009)

The people who take part in the neighbourhood council are still a bit too focused on things like streets, sidewalks, parks. But this is not the only thing we need. Nowadays, we are thinking more about culture, about the community.

(Monica, 19 in an interview with AP in 2009)

Only 7 from the 700 children for which this could be traced had ever fulfilled a function in a community organization, such as the communal kitchen, a glass of milk committee or the neighbourhood organization. When I asked one of the most experienced leaders in Pampas she responded:

"When we gather in our general assemblies, we always part in two. Some want this, the others want that, we always quarrel. The youngsters don't like this. And I think they are right when they say: you are always talking about the problems, but what we need here are solutions! The mentality and vision of us, the old leaders, does not change. And we are not clever enough to give more room to the youth. There are very few people that think that the young generation should assume leadership roles. We are the one that need to change (Nora, 55, interview in 2010).

The second generation has internalized many of the messages their parents transmitted. First and foremost they have internalized the ideal "to become a professional", and to focus on personal advancement. They have heard the stories of infighting and corruption, and thus have become to mistrust the community organizations. And an element not yet touched upon: collective action presupposes a responding state. The founding generation of Pampas complained endlessly about the absence of the state (especially the municipality). "The municipality never looks at Pampas, they are only interested in Ciudad de Dios and San Juan" (the more affluent areas in the district MH). Yet they nevertheless went to endlessly to knock on all possible doors, which in the end paid off. For the second and third generation the state is virtually absent (Plyustheva 2009).

Conclusions

For the new generations the old forms of collective action of an organized community that interacts with a somewhat responsive state does no longer fit, but a new forms are not yet clear. Will it all be "individual effort"? The "community spirit" and "social well-being" Turner expected to blossom in the *barriadas* evaporates over time, when the improvements that require collective action are realized. Further improvement is nevertheless needed. For the generation now in the family forming phase the housing situation is as pressing as it was for their parents, the wish to find a place for their own families is as strong. They live with their parents or in laws out of necessity, not out of desire. Land apt for invasion is however no longer available. More importantly: this new generation aspires to solve through the market.

The deteriorating security situation is a matter of urgency; it seriously endangers the well-being achieved in material terms.

That even the settlements on the steep slopes have now almost neared Turners phase "completed settlements", suggests that the struggle has been won. But live

in the *barriadas* continues, and brings new challenges. Turners “that what matters in housing is people, activity and place”, as Turner proclaimed in the 1960s. Yet the new generations and new realities require a very different repertoire of policies for community improvement. It will require careful research to uncover these new realities in the old *barriadas*.

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