

LIFE ON THE STREETS: VOICE AND POWER OF STREET TRADERS IN URBAN TANZANIA

Michal Lyons and Alison Brown

Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, London South Bank University, UK

michal@the-place.net & BrownAM@cf.ac.uk

Abstract

Globalisation and liberalisation have resulted in an increasingly informal urban workforce, in particular street and market traders (Carr and Chen, 2002) but this has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in political 'voice'. In practice, public discourse has vilified traders as a cause of crime and pollution (Popke and Ballard, 2004), while flagship experiments in participatory governance have focused on residential neighbourhoods (e.g. Hickey and Mohan, 2005) rather than such business communities, reinforcing exclusions. National policy either ignores urban informal workers (Mitlin, 2004) or seeks to formalise the extralegal economy (ILD, 2006), whilst city politicians strive for a modern city image by corralling 'untidy' traders into hidden enclaves or eliminating them from city streets through violent evictions (Brown, 2006a).

Traders have evolved grassroots associational strategies to meet modern demands on livelihoods (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005a). Research indicates that effective negotiation with urban authorities needs formalized associations (Rakodi 2003). However, associational power may be undermined by the increasingly competitive pressures of liberalisation (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005b).

The role of trader associations in the recent widespread eviction of traders from city centres in Tanzania provides a rich case study for an assessment of trends in the role and nature of associations. In the context of Tanzania's post-independence socialism and involvement in the UN-Habitat agenda of participatory city planning, the discourse on informal trading has been largely supportive, yet massive evictions have recently taken place (Brown and Nnkya, 2006). Have grassroots associations had political influence, e.g. softening the effects of harsh evictions that threaten the vulnerable poor? Have they merely polarised opinions, benefited an elite club, or jeopardised pro-poor negotiations? Have the poor emerged from recent policy implementation with a strengthened grassroots movement? This article explores.

Introduction

Background

In the course of globalisation and liberalization, major cities in both North and South have evolved increasingly bimodal labour markets (Sassen, 1991; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000). In the North, across the OECD, part-time or temporary jobs and self-employment have increased. Own-account work, particularly among women, has increased as a share of self-employment (ILO, 2002). In developing regions, the accelerated concentration of populations in dominant cities has contributed to a rapid growth in the informal economy (see, for example, De Soto, 1989).

Nowhere has this phenomenon been more rapid than in sub-Saharan African cities, where growth in urban populations has been accompanied by limited job creation amongst the poor (Cohen, 2004; Carr and Chen, 2002). Although precise measurement of informality is difficult (see Devey et al, 2003, on measuring informality in South Africa), efforts have been made to estimate its scale. Informal employment is now thought to account for around 60% of all urban jobs and to have provided 90% of all new jobs created in the last decade (ILO, 2002a, p.16; ILO, 2002b). Sharp rises have been seen particularly in own-account self employment. The Kenyan informal sector, for example, was estimated to account for 25% of non-agricultural GDP, approximately 60% of which was attributed to men, and 40% to women (although informal employment constitutes a higher percent of women's non-agricultural employment) (ILO, 2002a). By the end of 2001 informal employment was estimated at 81% of all private-sector employment, while small to medium enterprises, largely one-person businesses, comprised close to 75% of all national employment (Mitullah, 2003).

Street vendors are the largest sub-group of the informal workforce after home-based workers. Together these groups represent 10-35% of the non-agricultural workforce in developing countries, in comparison with 5% of the total workforce in developed countries (ILO, 2002). Estimates in 1999 (ILO, 2002a) put the number of street vendors in Kenya, for example, at over 400,000, or 8% of the non-agricultural labour force, with women estimated to comprise 33% of this group (ILO, 2002, pp 24,25). Later estimates are higher, putting the number of street traders operating in Nairobi alone at 500,000, while formal sites have only been found for 7,000 (Mitullah, 2003). Except in societies that restrict their mobility, women comprise 30-90% of street vendors in developing countries (ILO, 2002a).

At the same time, the failure of sub-Saharan African economies to compete successfully for a share in global manufacturing (Kaplinsky et al, 2002; Subramanian et al, 2007) has been accompanied by a rapid increase in the import of manufactured goods from China, far outstripping growth in the GDP (IMF, 2007). In turn, this has meant a shift in emphasis within the informal sector from petty manufacturing (Carr and Chen, 2002) to petty trading (UN-Habitat, 2007a). While some petty traders become substantial, formal merchants, most have begun as hawkers, and a large volume of petty trade is 'street trading' – it takes place in public space. Yet the growth of street trading has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in 'political voice'.

In practice, public discourse has vilified traders as a cause of crime and pollution. A number of studies explore fear and antagonism towards street traders. Popke and Ballard (2004) analyse reports and letters in the Durban press, identifying expressions of fear and anxiety that form part of residents' interpretive landscape. Traders are feared for undermining order and fear impels exclusion. Cresswell (1994 in Popke and Ballard, 2004) concluded that order is inscribed through space and place, and breaking the conventions over the use of space challenges accepted notions of order. Popke and Ballard highlight frequent calls to 'bring pavement trading under control' (p. 105), for traders 'to be sited in a designated part of town' (p. 105), and that '...the authorities in each area, ...should make them operate in very restricted areas' (p. 105).

Flagship experiments in participatory governance have sought to provide more inclusive approaches to urban decision making (Ackerman, 2003), and development theorists have

argued that institutionalised partnership in decision making is the most effective way to foster participation, achieve progressive transformation, and enhance pro-poor policies (Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Devas, 2004; Rakodi, 2003). A number of innovative attempts have been made to include non-formal groups, but these have focused on residential neighbourhoods. For example, participation in Kenya's Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan is based on residence (Devas, 2001), as are Colombo's CDCs and Kerala's participatory campaign (Isaac, 2000). Informal business communities are rarely recognized for this purpose, reinforcing exclusions. Where informal business people have been able to participate effectively in negotiation over urban decision-making, they have had support from well organized lobbies (Devas, 2004). In some cases, such lobbies have successfully advocated for change, for example, in Durban, particularly in Warwick Junction (UN-Habitat, 2007b). However, in most cases, they appear to have difficulty sustaining action over the long term and making their voice heard consistently. What are the barriers to the development of this power to lobby?

Although it is modified by culture, participation in social movements has long been known to be heavily dependent on prior social ties as a basis for recruitment. Established social settings are the locus for the emergence of new movements (Diani and McAdam 2003). Indeed, evidence suggests that the more costly and dangerous the collective action, the stronger and more numerous the ties required for individuals to participate.' (Della Porta and Diani, 1999:117).

Against a background of significant limitations in official commitment to participatory governance, relatively few examples of successful participation in effective processes in which municipalities can be held accountable, and continuing state ambivalence about the cultural, economic and political status of the informal sector, this paper explores the processes through which grassroots movements of informal traders remain marginalized in the local and national political process. Drawing on a recent case study of petty trading in urban Tanzania, it considers the multiple sources of exclusion that militate against grassroots action by petty traders and effectively deny them 'political voice', particularly through actions which militate against the development of stable social networks.

Aims

The fundamental argument of this paper is that effective 'political voice' rests on multiple sources of power, not least, social networks; and that, conversely, lack of effective voice is maintained by multiple mechanisms of exclusion. Through probing the eviction and relocation processes, the key stakeholders involved in them, and their impacts on petty traders, the aim of the paper is to explore the multiple mechanisms by which traders are marginalized and prevented from gaining the public legitimacy which could support their attempts to influence the political process.

Methods

The paper draws mainly on preliminary findings from an on-going research project and on earlier research on street trading in Dar es Salaam in 2003/04 (Brown, 2006b). This allows the issues of petty trading to be examined over a period of time and in very different contexts of urban scale; urban economic drivers; spatial development patterns, and rural-urban links.

Tanzania was selected for this study because of its recent drive to establish a national framework for urban policy in this field, allowing a multi-city analysis of the issues; because of the focus of policies on eliminating urban informal trade; and because of the failure of apparently well-established grass-roots organizations to have a significant impact on the policy at either consultative stages or implementation.

In this paper, petty traders are conceptualized in two main groups, loosely termed 'formal' and 'informal':

1. 'Formal' petty traders who have access to legal premises. These include traders working in both licensed and unlicensed businesses, with a broad range of business turnover and physical facilities from formal municipal markets to privately tenanted (or owned) shops.

2. 'Informal' petty traders who with no formal access to a trading space. These included traders with a broad range of physical trading arrangements, from hawking, trading off cloths or tables and permanent kiosks. Also included in this group are traders who have gone on to occupy formal premises following relocation.

Data was collected through key-informant interviews in municipalities, with other stakeholders, and in the more formal sector. Extensive questionnaire-based interviews with informal traders were also carried out, but are not drawn upon in this paper.

Findings

Given sheer numbers of people involved in petty trade in Tanzania, and the socialist idealism, it could be expected that complex mechanisms for grassroots influence would have evolved. The evidence, however, is contradictory.

Tanzania – the state and informal trade

In Tanzania public policy has been significantly influenced by the philosophy of socialism and self-reliance first articulated in 1967 in the Arusha Declaration shortly after independence. Political participation was central to the socialist era of the 1960s-1980s, and has led to an emphasis on decentralization and local participation although some argue that the changes in fact undermined traditional social capital organisations (Tripp 1997, p. 70). Elected local government was re-introduced by the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act in 1984, with councils elected for each ward by direct popular ballot and a 25% quota for women. Multi-party democracy was re-introduced by the ruling CCM party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) in 1992.

Since then, reform and decentralization have been on-going; a national conference in 1996 laid down a shared vision of future local government leading to a policy paper in 1998 and further decentralisation. In urban areas, councillors are elected on a ward basis, with a quota of seats allocated for women councillors. Urban neighbourhoods are represented by a six-member elected *mtaa* council, which provides contact with local government, oversees local affairs, and mobilises development initiatives.

However mismanagement of nationalised enterprises, a steep drop in the world price of coffee and the war on Uganda precipitated economic collapse, forced the country to adopt an Economic Recovery programme designed to introduce a market-led economy (Evans with Ngalewa, 2003, Bigsten and Danielson, 2001) and led to dramatic changes in the structure of urban employment.

As a result of economic restructuring, like many African countries, Tanzania experienced a rapid increase in informal-sector activity. Between 1978 and 1991 the proportion of people working in the formal economy fell from 84% to 36% (Tripp, 1997, p. 187). By 1988 informal incomes constituted approximately 90% of the urban household cash income, with wage earnings making up the rest (Tripp, 1997), and by 1991 the informal sector was estimated to provide 43% of Tanzania's non-agricultural GDP – one of the highest in Africa.

While petty informal-sector trade had initially been an outlet for petty manufacturing and agriculture, in recent years fundamental changes in the nature of the trade have resulted from pressures of trade liberalisation and globalization, which have coincided not only with an increase in informality, but also with growth in the import of manufactured goods, particularly from China, which far exceeds growth in Tanzania's GDP (IMF, 2007), accelerating the growth of petty commerce, as distinct from petty manufacturing.

The development of petty trading and the informal use of urban space have been accompanied by a range of sometimes conflicting policy responses and interpretations. In 1963, bylaws had made petty trading illegal, and in 1974 the city authorities sought to deport all informal workers back to their villages, a policy that was largely unsuccessful. The 1983 Human Resources Deployment Act was intended as a penal code that branded all the self-employed as 'unproductive', introducing the new *nguvu kazi* license, but in it soon became evident that the government did not have the resources to continue repatriating 'unproductive' elements (Tripp, 1996, 1997).

Describing the decade from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, Tripp considered that a study of the urban informal economy in Tanzania would bring into sharp relief some of the most antagonistic conflicts between state and society (Tripp 1997:16). Both central and municipal governments adopted a non-tolerance approach and attempted the eviction of petty traders.

A more conciliatory approach was negotiated during the period 1992-2003, led from Dar es Salaam. In Dar es Salaam three factors have been critical in giving legitimacy and influence to informal traders. First, the reinterpretation of the 1983 Human Resources Deployment Act, required every able-bodied person to work, and was originally intended as a restrictive policy but was subtly 'reinterpreted' by those implementing the legislation, effectively conferring a 'right to work' on urban citizens. Second, the near bankruptcy and suspension of the city council in 1996 led to a restructuring and the introduction of three district councils as an intermediate tier of local government in the capital, and openness to new ideas (Brown, 2006a; Brown and Nnkya, 2006).

Third, and perhaps most important, the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project, introduced in 1992 as a pilot for the sustainable cities programme by UNDP and UNCHS, heralded a participatory basis for city planning, and the city consultation later that year identified nine critical urban issues one of which was 'petty trading' (Rutch, 2001; Nnkya, 2006). Taking a leadership role, the Working Group on Managing Informal Micro-Trade outlined strategies for integrating street traders into the urban economy, carried out sensitization work among politicians; and was instrumental in the formation of an inter-ministerial policy, also approved by the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce. The outcome was an acceptance and formalization of street trading in some areas, and the development of new markets for traders evicted from streets which were designated for clearance. The markets and stall prototypes developed by the National Income Generating Programme (NIGP) in a number of cities in this wave of reforms are still in use¹ (Nnkya, 2005:17).

The fundamental concept on which such an integrative approach must rest is a sense of mutual responsibility and commitment between the state and the private sector as a whole, which was never fully achieved. In 2002 the ILO published a 'Roadmap' study of the informal economy, commissioned by UNDP, the ILO and UNIDO. The study found that the regulatory and policy environment was a barrier to upgrading growth of micro- and small entrepreneurs, most of whom operate informally. Many legal requirements are a left-over from colonial times, and government officials hold the attitude that entrepreneurs are a source of personal revenue (ILO, 2002). The ILO noted: 'The first observation is that of an almost complete break in faith between the government and ordinary business people'. This creates a straitjacket of constraints around the informal business, barring it from operating legally and optimally, stifling growth and killing off positive attitudes' (ILO, 2002:21).

Two years later, with the passing of the Trading and Finance Act 2004, informal traders were further marginalized. No individual licences could now be granted for businesses with under TSh 20m turnover. This legislation has provided the overall framework for institutionalizing the informality – and illegality - of street trade. A further year on, De Soto described the difficulties facing businesses which meet this criterion in attempting to formalize and register. As for smaller businesses, petty traders could now work legally in public space only if employed by corporate distributors, or as tenants of formally licensed markets.

¹ Three of these, Stereo Market in Temeke, Makumbusho in Kinondoni and Kilombero in Mwanza, were surveyed in this study.

Although the SDP city consultation was re-run in 2005, street traders in Dar es Salaam were again on a knife edge. In March 2006 the prime minister issued an ultimatum requiring hawkers to leave the CBD, and several areas were cleared with bloodshed and casualties. Some of the traders went to a magistrate seeking a temporary injunction preventing eviction, and the Prime Minister suspended the process pending the allocation of suitable alternatives sites, but on 30 September 2006 the final clear-up went ahead and traders were moved to new makeshift markets (Joseph, 2006).

A few months later, in January 2007, the cities of Mbeya and Mwanza and the towns of Morogoro and Arusha, the four commercially dominant provincial centres in Tanzania, followed suit. Evictions, accompanied by violence, prosecution, fines and imprisonment were experienced by tens of thousands of traders, although there have been conflicting estimates of the numbers involved. Petty traders were evicted from the central-city and commercial-area public spaces where they traded, and most permanent or semi-permanent structures, such as kiosks, were demolished. A number of new, legal trading spaces have been provided, although nowhere do they meet the volume of demand. The associations representing the interests of street traders have thus been faced with a profound challenge.

Associational structure and voice

Informal networks are a living reality and crucial element of coping strategies in Tanzania, and exist throughout the informal manufacturing and petty trade sector. They are hard for outsiders to uncover, and the fluidity of networks defies formalisation and produces a situation of near invisibility (Simone, 2001 in Baker *et al*, 2002). Informal associations are mobilized in a crisis, for example to fight evictions. Reciprocal relationships between informal traders and the adjacent property owners are common - historically traders in the CBD negotiated space with Indian property owners, and today in outlying areas traders often have agreements with adjacent property owners, for example to provide overnight security in exchange for a trading site.

The Working Group on petty trading set up through the SDP made a number of recommendations, in particular the strengthening of trader associations to represent traders in dialogue with the authorities. By 1997 about 240 self-help groups representing 16,000 members had been formed (DCC, 1999) and two umbrella groups were established VIBINDO (Association of Small Businesses), and KIWAKU (an association of clothes sellers). Guidelines for Petty Traders were published in 1997, dealing with various urban management issues. The associations now manage much of the trading in the CBD, with good although informal access to the two tiers of local government, Dar es Salaam City Council and Ilala Municipality (Nnkya, 2006).

During the 1990s, traders associations appeared to have some influence, in particular VIBINDO, the union of associations, which had considerable prominence in negotiations on the informal economy. VIBINDO came to the fore during the 1990s and, technically registered as a 'society', now represents about 300 associations with a combined membership of about 40,000 people (Msoka, 2007). The constituent associations are largely area-based although some focus on particular product sectors. VIBINDO has three broad objectives: advocacy and representation; acquisition of vending space or plots, and provision of business information to members, and has sufficient capacity to employ staff and maintain offices.

Some of the associations are formal cooperatives, for example WAMBOMA, an area-based association within the CBD managing an area where imported fruit and vegetables are sold (Nnkya, 2006, p. 92). WAMBOMA organises street cleaning (hiring a women's cooperative from an informal settlement) and ensures that all traders within its area are licensed, and traders have confidence in its ability to resolve conflicts and negotiate with the city and district council. However, it is also exclusionary as few women traders work in its domain, and poor traders cannot afford the up-front licence costs. Elsewhere in the city, recognised representation appears to be patchy.

In the latest round of evictions, trader associations appear to have been excluded and lack political voice. Following the massive evictions and inadequate relocations mentioned above, continued protests in Dar es Salaam led to an agreement to build a new multi-million 'Business Park' to accommodate up to 10,000 traders and hawkers, with similar parks planned elsewhere (Jospeh, 2006). Yet the grassroots organization representing traders, who regard such projects as unlikely to serve their needs, regard this concession as a failure on their part to influence policies. Thus, despite their apparent social and political organization, traders have been able to influence policy only marginally, and have remained marginalized in urban decision making.

Despite this failure, the informal sector in Tanzania as a whole, now thought to include 90% of economically active people, is seen as a battle-ground for political influence among competing associations. In a debate on the informal economy held in Dar es Salaam recently, Nestory Ngula, secretary general of the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania - the largest unions VIBINDO, a small scale traders organisation, and its failure to prevent the recent nation-wide crackdown on illegal business in the sector. Such an organisation, he said, cannot challenge the eviction order in a court of law because has no legal recognition 'leaving their members helpless'. In response, 'VIBINDO chairman, Gaston Kikuwi, ... maintained that their association 300 plus trading groups contribute significantly to the national coffers, adding that the grouping must be recognised as a key player in the war against poverty. Under non-governmental organisation Act 1954 was association registered, he claimed' (Business Times, 2007).

Kommentar: Something missing here

In order to explore political voice the paper now explores first the drivers and objectives of municipal policy in Tanzania; and then, its impacts on traders and the multiple mechanisms by which it affects their political voice. The findings at this stage are preliminary.

Municipal interpretation of national policy

Key institutional stakeholders in the management of street trade are municipal administrations. They are the main agents of power and, to understand the policies adopted and relationships with grassroots organisations in the petty economy, it is necessary to understand their concerns.

Municipal officials approach to the management of their town and cities draws on aspirations of an ideal-city, founded on cities in the North and supported by town-planning philosophies from the 1960s and 70s. In this vision, development is plan-led and tightly controlled, land-uses are not mixed, and street trade does not exist, whilst cities which manifest the realities of a developing country are seen as failing in the race towards modernity and development. Hernochova writes that 'large-scale changes are always a burden and a major stress because they are an encroachment on what is normal. Painfully, people have to reassess their often very fragile identities' (1997:110). We argue that street traders have come to epitomize such major changes, and that their visibility renders them the focus of fears about the twin underlying trends of increased migration and informalization..

There is an alternative school of thought which seeks to combine and integrate ideas from the North without disenfranchising a large proportion of African society. This view is more often expressed by politicians than by municipality staff, but this is less common.

Every town's leadership has a vision for its future, drawing on analyses of economic growth potential and physical and other constraints. Interestingly, these visions for growth rarely accommodate petty traders on a scale which reflects their role in the urban economy today; while the formalization of petty trade itself is seen less as an opportunity for development than as a philanthropic duty, despite the large revenues earned by the sector. The development of space for traders is often discussed in terms of allocating minimum plots where they will not interfere with other uses, although it is sometimes seen as part of a strategy for local economic development or regeneration.

In all the major cities of Tanzania, the resident populations are estimated to have grown at around 8% per year on average since the 2001 census, of which perhaps 3% per year are

from natural increase. For most, the day-time population is greater than this. In the smaller towns and cities both daily and permanent migration are almost entirely rural-urban. In Dar es Salaam, some trades appear to be 'secondary' migrants from a provincial town, while others were born and raised in the city.

African municipalities generally do not appear to view the increase in population as a development opportunity, but as a threat to the status quo and as a potential discouragement to [corporate] inward investment. The successful integration of aspirations for both is essential to an acceptable, yet sustainable set of policies. Instead, there is a sense in municipal discourse that rural-urban migration threatens to over-run the city and that, ideally, migrants – and traders – should return to the rural areas or be relocated in suburban areas, far –and separate – from the main commercial and administrative areas of the city.

A number of key concerns emerge from these debates.

The extent to which street trade inhibits the free circulation of traffic is a major source of concern to municipal administrations, which fear that congestion will trigger investment flight from city centres to areas where accessibility is freer. Growing car ownership and rapidly increasing town-centre development densities make this a pressing concern in some areas. At the same time, it is recognized that other strategies will be needed to maintain the reductions in congestion, such as improvements to public transport.

Officials also express concerns about alleged links between street trade and street crime. Indeed, as in Durban (Popke and Ballard 2004) and Dakar (Simone, 2004), in municipal discourse petty traders are equated with a range of criminal behaviours. They are reported to be assisting larger traders to evade tax; and are also commonly described by municipal officials as organized groups of robbers; loiterers surveying property to identify opportunities for burglary; and opportunist thieves – or as touts selling shop goods on commission, helping formal businesses to evade tax.

Public health has also been mentioned as an argument for banning street trade - similar, again, to arguments voiced in most African cities. Two types of problem are perceived. First, the sale of prepared foods needs a clean environment and access to water, so that road-side trading is not acceptable – one solution proposed is the development of mobile vending carts. Second, located near to a disease vector, market crowds could facilitate the spread of infections. Clearly, both over-crowding and proximity to disease vectors are contingent, rather than intrinsic factors, but it is characteristic of this debate that the boundaries between the two are blurred, as in South Africa (Lipietz, 2004) and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (Simone, 2002).

One of the key problems for municipalities is that although, or because, the income from markets and shops is an important contributor to councils' operating budget, one of the highest sources of locally generated revenue, no part of it is ring-fenced for reinvestment in the sector. A common problem is that the strategies which increase rental properties and maximise revenue mostly involve severe reductions in the number of trading spaces. Several councils are exploring the potential to increase the number of rental shops and stalls through a Build-Operate-Transfer system on their own land (see below).

Impact on traders and opportunities for grassroots growth

Petty trading in Tanzania provides an important safety net for people in poverty or on a downward trajectory at virtually any stage of the working life. For many, a range of upward mobility strategies are possible. For example, a mother may live in poverty, but succeed in educating her children. A young man may work as a vendor and either amass sufficient capital to become a more established trader, or use petty trading as a means of support while undertaking a vocational course, and a young man with no dependents, and who is not subject to such shocks as repeated evictions and confiscations, may own or rent his own shop within less than five years.

Participation in the sector is by no means only a survival strategy. Petty trading is an avenue to a better life and affluence to some who started from very humble backgrounds. Many wholesale merchants and other large-scale traders have started as hawkers, yet now travel as far as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Dubai, and Italy on their own account. Petty trading is also used as a top-up strategy by people in formal employment, e.g. civil servants, typically using a loan guaranteed by their salary to invest in a business, generally operated by others, and sometimes providing a main source of income for the investor as well.

Separation from the formal economy

A general perception is that street traders constitute a threat to formal businesses, and some formal business owners consider that the eviction of hawkers has been good for their business, either because of reduced competition or because their shops were now more easily seen and approached. The overwhelming majority, however, suggest that petty trade is an important link between much formal business and the consumer public. Particularly those selling textiles by the piece (*kangas and kitenge*), second-hand shoes and clothes (*mitumba*), and a range of household goods, snacks and drinks, have noted a drop of up to 30%-50% of turnover since the evictions.

Rather than being a gambit for tax evasion, shop owners argue that the levels of trust between formal shops and hawkers are simply not high enough to allow them to give hawkers goods on commission. Instead, relocation of traders to distant sites has resulted in reduced rates of re-stocking by hawkers and other petty traders, leading to a reduction sales and turnover of wholesalers' goods. The policy of eviction has in effect resulted in economic marginalization, severing the supply links of petty traders.

Isolation in the margins of urban space

For any trader, sites identified as promoting high turnover and good business for petty traders have one thing in common: good access for customers (Brown, 2006a; Lyons and Mbiba, 2005). For a small trader, one of a multitude dealing in similar goods, convenient access for customers is of paramount importance because he or she are operating on tiny profit margins, possibly as little as 1-1.5% on operating capital per day. Particularly with small operating capital of say TSh 50,000 – 500,000 every transaction is crucial.

Proximity to the 'right kind' of customer is also important. Customers with a higher disposable income can buy more than the poor. Traders who are (re)located so that they can only reach poor customers are generally consigned to low profit margins and slow capital growth. It is very difficult for trades to recover the level of activity prior to relocation, particularly if they are moved to peripheral areas. This may be a particular problem for traders to who have given goods on credit, but their creditors cannot find them (Setsabi, 2006).

Poor infrastructure, such as seasonal road access, has further isolated some relocated traders from customers and suppliers, while the use of open sites discriminates against certain people, such as women traders and traders with physical disabilities. As a result of the social and attitudinal barriers facing women traders in Tanzania, many only go into the markets if forced to by family poverty. Their primary role is still seen as childcare and home-making. As one trader said: 'Who can bring their child to sit all day under this sun?' while another said: 'The children come and sit in the sun all day. It is too harsh. I can't let them wander... [and]... Food and drink are very expensive here'.

Eviction and relocation are thus commonly result in physical marginalisation, isolating traders from customers, and making the link more difficult still for the more vulnerable traders. Where trading sites do not attract enough custom, traders are forced out into public space, from where they may be repeatedly evicted, each time, severing links developed with customers through continued exposure.

Marginalisation in the land market

Insecurity of tenure is another facet of much relocation. For most traders who have endured evictions, there is no security of tenure even in municipal property. The land is often granted them on a temporary basis, and is often designated for other uses on the town plan.

In general, evicted traders have been moved to undeveloped sites, which cannot provide collateral for loans, a further source of marginalisation. The Build-Operate-Transfer procurement system, in which traders are required to fund the construction of their own premises, usually on municipality-owned land, is borrowed from the construction of major infrastructure projects. A valuation is carried out at completion, and a rent-free, or reduced-rent period of 5-15 years agreed. At an agreed point in this period, full ownership of the property reverts to the landlord. This system provides limited security, reduces the capital available for generating business growth, and does not provide security for formal loans, reinforcing De Soto's arguments about capital which is 'dead' as an asset in the formal market (ILD, 2005).

The barriers to accessing a secure trading space result in a thriving secondary rental market in municipal commercial property, which has been widely observed, for example in Zimbabwe (Brown, 2000). Secondary rents can be significantly (up to 10 times) higher than the primary rents, increasing costs for traders in the long run. Furthermore, the lack of secure tenure rights, even for a limited period, contributes to the impermanence of trader links to a given space, and reduces the potential for development of social networks.

Summary and conclusions

It is well established that at urban and national level, micro-enterprises rarely influence decision making to their advantage against established interests unless they are organised (Rakodi, 2003). The influence of trader networks and organisations in Tanzania has been mixed, and appears recently to have been marginalised.

Despite the importance of social action and organisation of established interests in effecting change, this analysis has indicated the plethora of mechanisms that marginalise and exclude urban poor petty traders. Even in Tanzania, with its rich history of social networks and associations, and political flirtation with communist policies that sought to give voice to the poor, the reality is very different.

The literature indicates that not until the 1990s were petty traders given any recognition. Until then, inherited planning regulations had sought to control and relocated the poor. During the 1970s and early 1980s, 'illegal' street traders were deported to rural areas, and not until the 1980s did the impact of economic recession and structural adjustment, which lead to a widespread shift in perceptions and an implicit if not explicit recognition of the inevitability of informal sector trade.

During the 1990s some scope for grassroots action was leveraged by the window of opportunity created by the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project, and the acceptance and organisation of petty trade advocated by the Working Group on Managing Informal Micro-Trade. This advocated strengthening associations as a focus for negotiation. However, high-level political intervention has undermined the period of accommodation.

The critical problem is that the teeming street life of the sub-Saharan African city, typified in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania's regional towns, does not fit with the modern city image, derived from northern norms and the debate on global competitiveness, which cites European, North American or even leading Asian cities seen as desirable norms.

At the same time, other fears linked with street trading appear to be exaggerated: crime, tax evasion, public health and damage to the economy appear not to be as serious as municipal officials consider. Furthermore, there is a fear that the petty economy and the congestion causes appears to be driving out investment in modern business construction that would otherwise help transform the urban economy. However, the benefits of street clearance, for

example the reduction of street congestion, do not appear to have been sustained in the face of other pressures.

The eviction and partial relocation of street traders; the heavy losses experienced through confiscations and property demolition; the damage to business arising from lost custom and interruption of supply chains; and the lack of secure access to space combine to exacerbate the isolation of traders from the mainstream economy, to reduce the possibility for them to develop stable social networks. There is no direct evidence that this undermines the lobbying on their behalf, but it is clear at least that the necessary conditions for the development of a strong grassroots movement do not exist at the moment.

Along with Michael Keith we would argue that, 'The street ... renders the social visible' (Keith 1995 310), and embodies ... urban social relations (Dudrah, 2003, 343). The people and activities thronging Tanzania's streets embody large-scale social change which challenge the ideal-city image aspired to by municipalities and engender the fear and stress identified by Hermochova. Accommodation is possible, but is not inevitable. Although there are models in Durban and elsewhere (UN-Habitat, 2007a) where this has been possible, this has been the product of discussions between government and traders, in the context of powerful pro-trader lobbies, which have forced acceptance of the inevitability and legitimacy of street trade.

In Tanzania, taken together with the broader policy environment, evidence so far indicates that the policies of eviction appear to have dealt a severe blow to the livelihoods of petty traders, but have also served to marginalize them spatially, economically, and socially from the mainstream of society and economy. The insecurity and impermanence have further undermined the potential to develop long-term relationships and is likely to stunt the nascent development of grassroots social and political networks. Until there is political recognition of the petty economy as a key source of economic growth, together with scope for institutionalising grassroots action, the exclusion will remain and vulnerability and urban problems will be perpetuated.

References

- ACKERMAN, J. (2003) Co-governance for accountability: beyond 'exit' and 'voice', World Development 32(3) pp447-463
- BAKER, J. and WALLEVIK, H. with OBAMA, J. and SOLA, N. (2002) The Local Government Reform Process in Tanzania: Towards a greater interdependency between local government and civil society at the local level, Research and Development Report no 6, Kristiansand, Agerforskning
- BROWN, A. (2000) Cities for People in Zimbabwe: Working Paper on Urban Space Design in a Developing Country City, Paper to the N-Aerus conference in Geneva on Cities of the South: Sustainable for Whom, Geneva, May, 2000
- BROWN, A. (ed) (2006a) Contested Space: Street trading, public space and livelihoods in developing cities, Rugby, ITDG Publishing
- BROWN, A. (2006b) Social, economic and political influences on the informal sector in Ghana, Lesotho, Nepal and Tanzania, in A. Brown (ed) Contested Space: Street trading, public space and livelihoods in developing cities, Rugby, ITDG Publishing
- BROWN, A. and NNKYA, T. (2006) Rights to the city: contested space and urban livelihoods, Paper to the World Planning Schools Conference, Planning for Diversity and Multiplicity, Mexico, 12-16 July 2006
- BUSINESS TIMES (2007a) Empowerment of the poor in Tanzania draws debate, 04.09.07 accessed on line
- CARR, M. and CHEN, M. A. (2002) Globalisation and the Informal Economy: How global trade and investment impact on the working poor, Geneva: International Labour Office

- CHARMES, J (2002) Women and men in the informal economy, a statistical picture, Employment Sector, International Labour Organization, Geneva
- CHEN, M. and CARR, M (2004) Globalisation, Social Exclusion, and Work: With Special Reference to Informal Employment and Gender, International Labour Review 143.1-2
- COHEN, B. (2004), Urban growth in developing countries: a review of current trends and a caution regarding existing forecasts, World Development 1(1) pp23-51
- DCC (1999) Strategic Urban Development Planning Framework: Draft for the City of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC)
- DELLA PORTA, D and DIANI, M (2006 [1999]) Social movements: an introduction, Blackwell
- DE SOTO, H. (1989) The Other Path. New York: Harper and Row.
- DEVAS, N. (ed) (2001) Urban Governance and Poverty, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham
- DEVAS, N. (2004), Urban Poverty, Voice and Governance in the Developing World, Earthscan
- DEVEY, R, SKINNER, C, VOLODYA, I (2002) The Informal Economy in South Africa: Who, where, what and how much? DPRU Second Annual Conference, Johannesburg, Oct 2002
- DIANI, M and McADAM, D, eds. (2003) Social movements and networks, Oxford University Press
- DUDRAH, R K (2003) Birmingham (UK) Constructing city spaces through Black popular cultures and the Black public sphere, City 6:3 335-349
- EVANS, A. with NGALEWA, E. (2003) Tanzania, in Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs making a difference? ed D. Booth, London, Overseas Development Institute
- HERMOCHOVA, S (1997) Reflections on living through the changes in Eastern Europe, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 552, 107-113
- HICKEY, S. and MOHAN, G. (2005) Participation: From tyranny to transformation? London and New York: Zed Books
- ILO (2002b) Roadmap study of the informal sector in mainland Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, April 2002, ILO UNIDO UNDP
- ILO (2002a) Women and men in the informal economy: a statistical picture, Geneva: International Labour Office
- INSTITUTO LIBERTAD y DEMOCRACIA (2005) The Extra-Legal Economy, its Archetypes and Size, Vol. II in Republic of Tanzania President's Office, Property and Business Formalisation Programme, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/mkurabita_report_indexf.html
- IMF (2007) Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed on line, 15.06.07
- IMF and WB (2004) The United Republic of Tanzania, Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP): Process and Arrangements Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), Independent Evaluation Office International monetary Fund and Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank
- ISAAC, T. and FRANKE W. (2000) Local Democracy and Development: People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning in Kerala, Left Word Books, New Delhi 2000
- JOSPEH, D. (2006) Dar endorses US\$10m for market complex, East Africa Business Week, 6 November 2006, http://www.busiweek.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2335&Itemid=9, accessed December 2006

- KAPLINSKY, R, MORRIS, M and READMAN, J (2002) The globalization of product markets and immiserizing growth: lessons from the South African furniture industry, World Development 30(7): 1159 - 1177
- LIPIETZ, B (2004) 'Muddling-through': Urban regeneration in Johannesburg's inner city presented to NAERUS annual conference, Barcelona, 16/17 September, 2004
- MITULLAH, W V (2003) Street Trade in Kenya: Contribution of research in policy dialogue and response, paper presented to Urban Research Symposium for Urban Development and Economic Growth, World Bank, 2003
- LYNCH, K (1977) Image of the City, Boston Mass.: MIT Press
- LYONS, M and MBIBA, B (2005) A handbook for market planning, London, LSBU
- LYONS, M. and SNOXELL, S. (2005a) Sustainable Urban Livelihoods and Market-place Social Capital: a comparative study of West African traders, Urban Studies, 42:8 pp1301-1320
- LYONS, M. and SNOXELL, S. (2005b) Creating Urban Social Capital: Some evidence from informal trades in Nairobi, Urban Studies, 42:7 pp1077-1097
- MARCUSE and VAN KEMPEN (2000) Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order. Oxford: Blackwell.
- MITLIN, D (2004) Understanding Poverty: What the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers tell us, London: IIED
- MSOKA, C. (2007) An assessment of the informal economy associations in Tanzania: the case study of VIBINDO Society in Dar es Salaam, paper to the conference on Informalising Economies and New Organizing Strategies in Africa, Nordic Africa Institute 20-22 April, 2007
- NNKYA, T J (2005) The Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project 1999-2003: from urban environment issues to upscaling strategies city-wide, Dar es Salaam: UNIP and UNDP
- NNKYA, T. (2006) An enabling framework? Governance and street trading in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in A. BROWN. A. (2006a) Social, economic and political influences on the informal sector in Ghana, Lesotho, Nepal and Tanzania, in A. Brown (ed) Contested Space: Street trading, public space and livelihoods in developing cities, Rugby, ITDG Publishing
- SUNDAY CITIZEN, 26.08.07 P 3: Arusha launches exercise to rid city of street kids
- PHILLIPS, S. (2002) Social capital, local networks and community development, in C. Rakodi with T. Lloyd-Jones (eds) Urban Livelihoods: A people centred approach to reducing poverty, pp133-150, London, Earthscan
- POPKE, E. J. and BALLARD, R., (2004) Dislocating modernity: Identity, space and representations of street-trade in Durban, South Africa, Geoforum 35, pp 99-110
- RAKODI, C. (2003) Politics and performance: the implications of emerging governance arrangements for urban management , Habitat International 27(4) pp523-547
- RUTSCH, H. (2001) "From 'Planning the City' to a 'City that Plans': The Experience of Dar es Salaam, United Nations Chronicle XXXVIII (1), <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue1/0101p62.html>, accessed November 2005
- SASSEN, S. (1991) The Global City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- SIMONE, A (2002) The City Yet to Come, Barcelona, CCCB
- SETŠABI, S. (2006) Contest and conflict: governance and street livelihoods in Maseru, Lesotho, pp 131-148 in A. Brown (ed) Contested Space: Street trading, public space and livelihoods in developing cities, Rugby, ITDG Publishing

- SUBRAMANIAN, U and MATTHIJS, M (2007) Can Sub-Saharan Africa Leap into Global Network Trade? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4112, January 2007
- TRIPP, A.M. (1996) What went right in Tanzania? people's response to directed development, in What Went Right in Tanzania : People's Response to Directed Development, ed.M. Swantz and A. M. Tripp, Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam University Press
- TRIPP, A M (1997) Changing the Rules: the politics of liberalization and the urban informal economy in Tanzania, Berkley: University of California Press
- UN-HABITAT (2007) 'More and more youth in the informal sector' Habitat Debate - Forum , June 2007, P.9
- UN-HABITAT (2007) 'Bringing the informal economy into urban plans – a look at Warwick Junction, South Africa' Habitat Debate – Case Study , June 2007, P.11