

# **Settlement Upgrading Actors and Local Responses to Urban Inequalities in the inner-city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

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## **Introduction**

In the cities of developing countries, economic globalisation and rapid urbanization are increasingly recognized as the major driving forces of urban transformation. While economic globalisation is contributing to the increasing gap between the rich and the poor rapid urbanization is over burdening the existing meagre resources (Burgess et al, 1997; Rakodi, 1997, UN-Habitat, 2004).

One of the best medias for the propagation of economic globalisation has been the neo-liberal policy and its extension of Structural Adjustment Policies. Through its favouritism to the expansion of self regulating market, the purpose has been private gain and maximization of profit, resulting in the marginalization of large numbers of people (Burgess et al, 1997; SAPRIN, 2002; UN-Habitat, 2001; UN-Habitat, 2003). Furthermore, reality shows, the so-called invisible hand of markets does not give solutions to environmental degradation. Rather, scarce public resources may be allocated in support of projects intended to create positive city image in the pretext of attracting investments but with little value to the daily lives of the poor. Such projects create islands of activities, for those who can afford, surrounded by slums<sup>1</sup>.

Slums are also beset by inequalities from within – territorially based inequalities. These inequalities are induced by discrepancies of access to local resources, spatial locations, societal organizations, personal relationships, land ownership and tenure (Stokes, 1962; Marris, 1981; Sen 1999; UN-Habitat, 2003).

Both the externally and internally engendered inequalities are further compounded through the process of rapid urbanization. Slums are getting overcrowded through rural to urban migration, natural population increase and boundary redefinition of cities. In 2001, 924 million people (31.6 %) lived in slums. In the next 30 years the number of ‘slum’ dwellers will be about 2 billion (UN-Habitat, 2003). In Addis Ababa, alone, it is estimated that 80% of the population are living within the 85% of the housing stock located in slums.

In the aftermath of the slum clearances of the 50s and 60s the key lesson learned was that slums have an inherent potential for improvement; that the energy and resources of low-income groups can be mobilised for the betterment of the environment (Abrams, 1964; Turner & Goetz, 1967, Turner, 1976). Based on this lesson, in-situ upgrading, as opposed to demolishing and relocation, has been the preferred approach. It is preferred because, among other things, it preserves the existing economic system and social network and is cheaper relative to other approaches (Perlman, 1981; Martin, 1983; Werlin, 1999; UN-Habitat, 2003). It has been widely practiced throughout the world, in different countries, albeit in various forms and strategies. Attempts were made to categorize these different versions of in-situ upgrading. Abbot (2002)

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Slum’ is an imprecise notion. In developing countries it may refer to lower quality housing and is used interchangeably with spontaneous settlements, shanty houses, squatter settlements, ‘informal’/non-formal settlements and low-income housing (UN-Habitat 2003). It has now been re-introduced in the development discussion, as dwellers themselves prefer to be referred as ‘slum dwellers’, for example, as in a ‘federation of slum dwellers’ (See also d’ Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:7 and Hassan et al, 2005:18). In the context of Ethiopia it signifies physically deteriorated settlements inhabited by relatively poor households, rather than the classic slums of despair.

established three categories of thematic approaches: physical infrastructure provision, community action planning and holistic (comprehensive) plan. Huchzermeyer (in Abbot, 2002) created two broad categories: externally designed comprehensive upgrading and support-based interventions. Nevertheless, since the focus of this paper is on the relationship between settlement upgrading actors and local responses, actor-based classification of upgrading is outlined. Based on the types of intervention in the case areas, the paper identifies three categories of upgrading approaches: 1) NGO-driven, 2) NGO-driven, community-based and 3) community (*Iddir*<sup>2</sup>)-driven. The role of the actors and the mechanism of channelling funds in each of these approaches are investigated followed by a discussion on local responses. A comparison of the three approaches reveals that local response is sustained to the extent upgrading approaches include community-based channelling of funds and values which make life worth living for the inhabitants.

The paper derives from the author's ongoing PhD project, which analyses the interaction between inner city settlement upgrading, tenure and spatial attributes. The data was gathered largely through a qualitative method. It was gathered during two periods of fieldwork each spanning five months. The data relies on both secondary and primary sources- semi structured interviews, informal discussions, focus discussion group, observations and court cases.

### **The studied areas**

A World Bank study in 1978 identified eight *kebeles*<sup>3</sup> in the city of Addis Ababa as the poorest of the poor. As one of the members of the International co-ordinating committee, Redd Barna<sup>4</sup>–Ethiopia, henceforth RBE, took the initiative to implement an urban upgrading project in one of the identified areas *Woreda*<sup>5</sup> 3 *Kebele* 41<sup>6</sup> - commonly known as Teklehaimanot. The project was commenced in 1981 and phased out in 1986. This project was later extended to three adjoining *kebeles* by a local NGO. In 1983 RBE signed a second agreement with the city administration of Addis Ababa to undertake another upgrading project in *Woreda* 21 *Kebele* 13 - Kirkos area. In 1987 RBE offered assistance to do similar projects in other parts of Addis Ababa. The city administration forwarded a list of areas identified for upgrading. Out of the list provided RBE selected *Woreda* 11 *Kebele* 14 - in the Menen area. This was accepted by the city administration making it the third of its type.

In addition to Teklehaimanot, Kirkos and Menen, in this paper, a fourth upgrading activity in *Kolfe area* was also studied. In this area, unlike the other three, it is a coalition of *iddirs* (*Tesfa* Development and Social Association), which has been carrying out the upgrading activities.

### **Teklehaimanot: NGO-driven, community based settlement upgrading**

Teklehaimanot is an area located in the inner city of Addis Ababa adjacent to the greatest open market in Ethiopia – *Merkato*. The inhabitants of Teklehaimanot are mainly families headed by self-employed women and men with the lowest income. RBE was involved in the upgrading of one *kebele* in Teklehaimanot – *Kebele* 41, from 1981-1986. Following phasing out of RBE's

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<sup>2</sup> Traditional, home-based burial association

<sup>3</sup> *Kebele* is the smallest administrative unit (local government)

<sup>4</sup> Norwegian “Save the Children”

<sup>5</sup> The next higher administrative unit comprising a number of *kebeles*.

<sup>6</sup> With the recent restructuring of *Woreda* and *Kebele* boundaries, this and the names of the rest of the *kebeles* is changed. However, the paper uses the old naming or commonly known names to be consistent with the available documents.

intervention, the project was extended to three adjoining *kebeles* (*Kebele* 30, 42, 43) by a former employee of RBE through an NGO - Integrated Holistic Sustainable Urban Development Project (IHSUDP). The four upgraded *kebeles* had a total of 30,000 population. While the guiding principles behind RBE's upgrading project was to respond to the needs and problems of children that of IHSUDP's were claimed to be: *Integration*, referring to the relationship between community development, health and physical upgrading; *Holism*: referring to the inseparable needs of a whole person situated both at the family and community levels; *Conscientization*: referring to the need for attitudinal change and human development; and *Participation*: referring to the need of the involvement of the community to ensure sustainability. Unlike RBE whose focus was the well being of children, IHSUDP had no preference of a certain segment of society.

IHSUDP's project was phased out after seven years (1989-1996). All activities undertaken by the project were handed over to the community through the established Community Based Organisation, known as Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization (CBISDO).

In *Kebele* 41, RBE's activities were mainly limited to physical upgrading: the construction and maintenance of housing and related facilities. On the other hand IHSUDP was engaged in three components: health, education and physical upgrading. Thus, among other things: health centre, drop-in home for the old and various income generating activities were established. To enable the community to sustain the upgrading efforts, the community was organized up to the neighbourhood level. Community workers (*bicha lebash* or yellow girls, because of their yellow uniforms) were trained to bridge the activities between IHSUDP and the community.

### **Kirkos: NGO-driven settlement upgrading**

Following the phasing out of the project in *Kebele* 41 - *Teklehaimanot*, RBE, in 1983 initiated another project in *Woreda* 21 *Kebele* 13 of Kirkos area. Collaboration between RBE, the *kebele* administration and the community was forged. The responsibility of each actor was delineated: RBE to fund, manage and coordinate the project; the *kebele* to mobilize residents; and the community, in collaboration to the other parties, to participate in the implementation of the project.

Unlike *Teklehaimanot*, in Kirkos more components were introduced to attend to the needs of the children. The strategy followed was through focusing on primary health, education, housing, income generation and the establishment of a Saving And Credit Cooperative (SACC). The concept of a revolving fund was also introduced to be sourced from income generating units and rent from newly constructed houses.

RBE managed, in addition to the construction of 280 new housing units, to provide health facilities and schools, to establish income generating units, such as: a vegetable shop, a self help-food preparation centre, a youth girls' doll production centre, baking centres, a grinding mill, a recreation centre, a butchery, a public shower and common water points. The houses and facilities were handed over to the *kebele* administration and target families with the understanding that the generated income will be used as a revolving fund for the promotion of community development.

However, post phase out, what happened was far from the envisioned. According to RBE's document (1991) and interviews with residents and SACC officials, the *kebele* evicted target groups. Unlawful occupation of houses by individuals who were not identified as a target group, took place. Most of the houses were distributed based on political favouritism and acquaintance.

House rent was increased on newly constructed houses to push out the target group. The RBE established SACC was suspended. The fund from income generating activities was not utilized for intended purpose, rather it was mishandled. Houses and facilities remained without any maintenance, thus fast deterioration took place.

### **Menen: NGO-driven, community based settlement upgrading**

RBE next intervened in *Woreda 11 Kebele 14*, commonly known as Menen, albeit with a modified upgrading approach. Menen was developed during the early period of Addis Ababa's growth. Its layout is typical of the early neighbourhoods (*sefers*), with meandering streets, irregular plots, physically dilapidated structures and poor inhabitants.

In December 1987 RBE outlined a project proposal to upgrade the area. RBE's upgrading approach remained similar to that of *Teklehaimanot* and *Kirkos* except, this time, it introduced the concept of private ownership of the housing component. The project built 198 housing units in 23 blocks and handed them over to an established SACC. The SACC in addition to temporarily owning the houses has also been helping to increase the households' income through its saving and credit scheme. Thus the SACC was serving as a foundation for the whole process of settlement upgrading.

The method used by RBE to hinder the transfer of houses, e.g. to middle income people, was by avoiding one-time handouts and tying the house ownership to a matching input principle. The houses were also made non transferable to a third party for 20 years (the age required for a child to support him/her self). The targeting of women to be owners of houses was also another component. The SACC was thus made an 'enabler' rather than a 'provider', and the housing as a service and process and not a project. RBE granted 55% of the construction cost of the new houses and the remaining 45% were left to be matched by the beneficiaries in twenty years time. The monthly repayment amount of the housing loan was calculated to be 1 Birr per m<sup>2</sup> per month for twenty years. The area of the smallest housing unit was 10 m<sup>2</sup> and the largest was 28 m<sup>2</sup> and the repayment differed accordingly. After twenty years and upon the settlement of the loan the ownership title of the house will be transferred to the beneficiaries. The SACC has set a by-law where beneficiaries cannot sell, mortgage or rent out the house until they complete the repayment and obtain ownership title. According to RBE's document (1994), before upgrading 70% of the population lived in *kebele*-owned rental houses and about 16% of the households were co-dwellers.

By the end of the project, in 1993, in addition to the housing units and related facilities, 74 health facilitators, 109 health scouts and 4 sanitary guards were trained; sanitary committees and HIV-AIDS club were formed. An existing kindergarten was maintained and expanded with the construction of two additional classrooms. Two grain mills, shower units and water points were installed, to be used as a financial source for the Kindergarten. *Tshehay Chora* high school, located adjacent to *Kebele 14*, was supported by constructing 8 classrooms extension, fully furnished, to be used by all *Kebele 14* children. The management of the school constructed 2 classrooms and furnished them as a matching input. The project also provided water lines with drinking taps, and a play ground in the school compound. One *injera* (Ethiopian flat bread) backing centre with 5 electrical stoves (*mitad*) was also given to the SACC to generate income for a revolving fund.

### **Kolfe: Community-driven settlement upgrading**

According to the local survey done by the Addis Ababa City Administration Urban Management Institute (2005), *Kolfe* sub-city<sup>7</sup> has a population of 281,119, which is 9.54% of the city's population. The number of households in the sub-city is about 55,000. The survey indicated that the majority of the areas in the sub-city are considered slum. *Tesfa* Social and Development Association (TSDA) was established in 2000 with the purpose of improving the poor living conditions of its members living in the sub-city.

TSDA is a coalition of *iddirs*. *Iddir* is found in all towns of Ethiopia. Generally, *iddir* membership is of paramount importance to inhabitants. Among other things, this has to do with the status and respect it attributes to the bereaved. The more the number of people attending a burial the more it indicates the status and/or social acceptance of the deceased and his/her family. Members pay their dues regularly and are expected to attend meetings and participate in burials by accompanying the coffin, extending emotional support to the bereaved, and offering food and drink to mourners. Further, *iddirs* provide financial assistance to cover funeral expenses, which is of the utmost importance for the majority of *iddir* members as they are generally low income.

The critique of *iddirs* has always been that they focus on death rather than on the present life. Some also go further, and demand *iddirs* to be involved in community development. However, much as the critique sounds good, the problem of *iddirs* has been that they do not have the capacity, resources and institutional structure that would enable them to stretch themselves to development endeavours. Contemplating what can be done to involve *iddirs* in community development, in recent years there has been a growing interest in the formation of coalitions of *iddirs* by both the government and some *iddirs* in order to mobilize resources and have concerted development activities. The establishment of *Tesfa* Social and Development Association (TSDA) is one of these efforts.

According to the founders of TSDA, currently members of TSDA's management committee, the coalition was initially initiated with the vision of tackling poverty and assisting members of *iddirs* who cannot afford the monthly dues because of old age or lack of income. Those who cannot pay their dues used to be obliged to quit their membership. In such circumstances, family members of the deceased were left with no choice but to beg for money on the streets, to cover burial expenses. Having seen such unfortunate situations, and having also in mind that *iddirs* should be involved in community development, three *iddir* leaders came up with the idea of forming a coalition. Following consultation with constituent members, TSDA was formed in 2000. According to the information collected from TSDA's Planning and Programming office up to May 2005, TSDA had twenty-six member *iddirs* with more than 4000 households comprising a population of about 29,000. In June 2000, TSDA registered with the municipality of Addis Ababa, and in March 2002 with the Ministry of Justice (Voice of *Tesfa*, 2002). TSDA's registration with the Ministry, can be said, was a turning point as it enabled it to function in the capacity of an NGO. NGOs can only secure their legal status after registering with the Ministry of Justice.

TSDA has been intimately working with a number of NGOs, among them: Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), Hope for African Children Initiative (HACI), CARE Ethiopia and HelpAge Ethiopia. So far TSDA's focus areas were projects on HIV/AIDS, upgrading of houses, extending assistance to the elderly and orphans, providing

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<sup>7</sup> Addis Ababa is divided into ten sub-city administrations each having about ten *kebeles* under its jurisdiction. Sub-city is the new naming of *woreda*.

credit and saving schemes, sponsoring skill training and job creation, providing health service, establishing kindergartens and advocacy against harmful traditional practices (Voice of Tesfa, 2002). In partnership with HelpAge only, TSDA was able to handle projects worth over 500,000 Birr<sup>8</sup>. The projects include: the physical upgrading of 51 houses for the elderly, a loan of 500 Birr to 75 destitute elderly for an income generating revolving fund, grant of funds to 25 children of the elderly, eye cataract operations for 136 elderly and regular provision of uniforms and school equipment for 90 orphans.

### Upgrading actors and local response

In Teklehaimanot, the main actors for the upgrading projects were: International donor agencies, IHSUDP, the local governments (*kebeles*) and the community. IHSUDP was the initiator and driving force of the project. The attitude and response of *kebeles* was rather passive, at most in the form of agreeing not to, for example, increase house rent or displace tenants post phase-out. IHSUDP enjoyed wide support from international NGOs and donors and played a key role in channelling funds to the target group. Post phase-out CBISDO was established and funds were channelled through it. However, to date, IHSUDP is the main actor, behind the scene, backing CBISDO by soliciting funds for the purpose of running the donor-dependent social facilities and their staff (See Figure -1).

At the early stage of the project the involvement of the community through a structure that went down up to the neighbourhood level, namely, *yegurbetna* committee (neighbours' committee) was highly acclaimed. It even secured international recognition for being a good mechanism for reaching the grassroots. However, post phase-out, this structure only operated sporadically. It was the CBISDO that was left to oversee the IHSUDP-built social facilities and their staff. Regarding the physical upgrading of houses, there was a tendency of going back to slum, as there was no maintenance. The reason for the lack of maintenance was the failure of the tenants in paying their monthly dues. Collected rent was supposed to be used for the maintenance of the housing. Post phase-out the ownership of the housing remained in the hands of the *kebele*, while the rent was agreed to be collected by CBISDO. According to the manager of CBISDO, there was no mechanism of enforcing the agreement of rent collection, hence the reason for failing to collect the arrears and maintaining the houses.




Fig.-1: Mechanism of channelling fund in Teklehaimanot




Fig.-2: Mechanism of channelling fund in Kirkos

<sup>8</sup> Exchange rate of 1USD is about 8.87 Birr.

In Kirkos, the main actors were RBE, *kebele* and the community. At the initial stage RBE was directly investing funds in the target group. Upon phase-out the *kebele* was assigned as a caretaker of the RBE-built facilities and administrator of the revolving fund (See Figure-2). However, as mentioned earlier, the envisioned aim of the project was disrupted because of the lack of capacity and proper management on the part of the *kebele*. Hence, the inhabitants were in disarray and with low interest in responding to the need of community development.

In Menen, at an early stage, RBE was directly funding the project, but later the SACC was established and all the income generating units and housing were put under it. The SACC became the foundation for sustaining the project as it was run by the beneficiaries themselves and was accountable to the beneficiaries (See Figure-3). Movement toward the private ownership of housing has been going as planned. The collaboration enjoyed with the sub-city administration should also be mentioned. It was as a result of the good will of the sub-city that the process towards the RBE-built house ownership was facilitated. After fourteen years (with six more years to go) most of the inhabitants succeeded in settling their dues. In 2004, they started to pay land and house tax, which was a big step towards ownership of the houses.

In Kirkos, in 1991, a group of residents learning about the progress made in Menen regarding the house ownership, started to raise the issue of ownership. Before upgrading the tenure type was public rental and it remained the same after. The group filed a complaint against the *kebele* administration. It submitted a petition to the sub-city, listing all the misdeeds of the *kebele* administration. The sub-city administration instructed the *kebele* administration to properly study and investigate the complaints and to come up with decisions that were to be announced at a public meeting. An investigation committee was assigned. However, according to interviews with residents, the findings were not disseminated to the public, but suppressed by the then *kebele* authorities.

In 2000 the same group of concerned inhabitants re-established a SACC, after Menen's model, to better pursue their claim of house ownership. As mentioned earlier, the initially RBE established SACC was suspended by the *kebele*. The basis for the claim to own the RBE-built houses was the precedence created in the case of Menen, in which RBE introduced the concept of private ownership as a mechanism of reaching the target group.

The Kirkos SACC asked the *kebele* to handover the RBE-built facilities: the housing, an assembly hall, an office building, a grinding mill, a recreation centre, a public shower, a common water point, a women's self help centre, a clinic, a kindergarten etc. The *Kebele* refused. However, as a result of the persistent efforts of the SACC, the *kebele* inhabitants elected another Investigation Committee. The mandates of the Committee were to investigate and report issues regarding the *kebele* administration and the facilities established by RBE. The findings of the Committee were in favour of the SACC.

In 2004, in a *kebele* public meeting, facilitated by the sub-city administration, it was decided that the RBE-built facilities and income generating units were to be handed over to the SACC. However, the ardent wish of some of the inhabitants for the private ownership of the newly built houses was not accepted by the sub-city. The SACC was only allowed to collect rent and use it for a revolving fund. The issue of ownership of the houses remained unsolved. Unlike Menen's case where RBE made it clear that the SACC is the owner of the housing component and related facilities, in Kirkos there was no clarity on this issue. Of course, in Menen, it was after the lessons learned in Kirkos that RBE made it clear that the houses should be handed over to the Menen's SACC.

Unlike Menen, though Kirkos' SACC did not succeed yet in owning the houses, it managed to control the income of all RBE-built income generating activities, including the rent collected from the new houses. It also succeeded in making some contributions towards community development. According the chairman of the SACC, in response to a call from the *kebele*, the SACC contributed for the construction of 12 toilets, maintenance of 4 kitchens, and pavement of 1425.5 m<sup>2</sup> of roads with 150.60 m<sup>2</sup> of drainage ditch.




Fig.-3: Mechanism of channelling funds in Menen




Fig.-4: Mechanism of channelling funds in Kolfe

In Kolfe TSDA was the initiator and the driving force of the projects. Though it had to enter into partnership with a number of NGOs it remained as a focal organization working for and with the target group. Every fund secured from NGOs was channelled through it (See Figure-4). TSDA's administrative structure was based on the idea that the coalition should be run by the leaders of member *iddirs*. Thus, the leaders of member *iddirs* were simultaneously members of TSDA's Board of Directors. This structure, basically, was found to be effective, as the link between the grassroots, who are members of individual *iddirs*, and TSDA was easily facilitated. The grassroots convey their voice through the *iddir* leaders who are simultaneously members of the Board of Directors. Therefore, TSDA is basically an association led by its members and accountable to its members.

The collaboration between TSDA and the *kebeles* was also successful. The collaboration spanned from jointly identifying target groups to facilitating the smooth operation of TSDA. The handing over of the *kebele*-owned assembly hall and office premises for the use by TSDA can be cited.

The success of TSDA and its members in pursuing their cause has to do with two main issues: 1) the risk of being expelled from *iddir* membership, thus denial of a dignified burial; and 2) the increase in the number of deaths of HIV-AIDS victims. The second issue has directly affected *iddirs*, because they have to pay to every bereaved family a sum amounting 550 Birr. This has led to a sharp decrease of their financial capital.

## Summary and conclusion

The paper attempted: to identify settlement upgrading actors, to understand mechanisms of channelling funds and the character of local responses. It revealed three components which could be important in dealing with the urban inequalities prevalent in slums: 1) the importance of the type of relationship among upgrading actors 2) the method of channelling funds and 3) the need of incorporating values that make life worth living for the inhabitants.

In Teklehaimanot, the fact that the channelling of funds, both pre and post phase-out, continued to be through an NGO had contributed to creating some sense of dependency in the inhabitants. Except for the efforts of CBISDO to maintain the donor-dependent social facilities, the initially formed grassroots committees such as neighbourhood (*yegurbetna*) committee and the community workers (yellow girls) are no longer in place or are acting only sporadically. The lack of responsible ownership and maintenance has led to the gradual deterioration of the housing. These problems show that the inhabitants were not motivated enough to continuously respond and invest their time, energy and money. They still expect IHSUDP or its extension CBISDO to continue their support indefinitely.

In Menen, a consistent local response was observed. The reason for it was the introduction of the concept of private ownership of housing. In the context of Ethiopia private ownership of property is highly valued cultural element. It is a common experience to spend years of court litigation to secure the ownership of small piece of property, more often than not, for the sake of social status and pride. However, it could easily be discerned, local response could have declined if the ownership status were given as one time hand out. Local response was highly motivated and sustained because granting of the sought after value was extended over time and unfolded progressively while demanding a matching input from the inhabitants. The committee running the SACC has been dedicated volunteers with an ultimate goal of owning a house. In the process, the community has also been enjoying social stability and income increase through the SACC's saving and credit scheme. It can be said that the fact that the SACC was instituted between the target people and the RBE-built facilities has become a good foundation for creating a sense of ownership and continuity.

In Kirkos, though initially the local response was declined as a result of the mismanagement of the project by the *kebele*, later it became reinvigorated, inspired by the achievements of Menen. The lesson from Kirkos's case was that collaborating with local governments without clear terms of agreement could be detrimental. Even if there are clear conditions of agreement local governments may misuse their power and act contrary to the will of the inhabitants.

In Kolfe, what was at stake was burial dignity and the funds of the *iddirs* affected by the rate of deaths from HIV-AIDS. Because of these *iddir* members had to collaborate with TSDA both to secure burial services and save the dwindling funds. Thus, TSDA was able to achieve various development programmes from a wide and sustained source of *iddir* membership. The fact that TSDA was self-initiated, without external interference, has also enabled the grassroots to remain as agents of change rather than being mere recipients of benefits.

In conclusion, inhabitants may become agents of change to the extent that upgrading processes include community-based channelling of funds and values that make life worth living for the inhabitants.

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